Abstract. In 1985 Fell and Diffie proposed constructing trapdoor functions with multivariate equations [11] . They used several sequentially solved stages. Another idea of building triangular systems we call T has been initiated by Shamir. In the present paper, we study a more general family of TPM (for "Triangle Plus Minus") schemes: a triangular construction mixed with some u random polynomials and with some r of the beginning equations removed. We go beyond all previous attacks proposed on such cryptosystems using a low degree component of the inverse function. The cryptanalysis of TPM is reduced to a simple linear algebra problem called MinRank(r): Find a linear combination of given matrices that has a small rank r. We introduce a new attack for MinRank called 'Kernel Attack' that works for q r small. We explain that TPM schemes can be used in encryption only if q r is small and therefore they are not secure. As an application, we showed that the TTM cryptosystem proposed by T.T. Moh at CrypTec'99 [15, 16] reduces to MinRank(2). Thus, though the cleartext size is 512 bits, we break it in O(2 52 ). The particular TTM of [15, 16] can be broken in O(2 28 ) due additional weaknesses, and we needed only few minutes to solve the challenge TTM 2.1. from the web site of the TTM selling company, US Data Security. We also studied TPM in signature, possible only if q u small. It is equally insecure: the 'Degeneracy Attack' we introduce runs in q u · polynomial.
Introduction
The current research effort in practical public key cryptography introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, with univariate polynomials over ZZ N , is following two paths. The first is considering more complex groups, e.g. elliptic curves. The second is considering multivariate equations. Though many proposed schemes are being broken, some remain unbroken even for the simplest groups like ZZ 2 .
One of the paradigms for constructing multivariate trapdoor cryptosystems is the triangular construction, proposed initially in an iterated form by Fell and Diffie (1985) . It uses equations that involve 1, 2, . . . , n variables and are solved sequentially. The special form of the equations is hidden by two linear transformations on inputs (variables) and outputs (equations). We call T this triangular construction. Let TPM (T Plus-Minus) be T with added final u random (fullsize) quadratic polynomials, and with r of the beginning equations removed.
The cryptosystem TTM, proposed by T.T. Moh at CrypTec'99 is in spite of an apparent complexity, shown in 2.4 to be a subcase of TPM. The initially proposed scheme is very weak due to linear dependencies and in section 4.2, we present the solution (plaintext) to the TTM 2.1 challenge proposed by the company US Data Security, which is currently selling implementations of TTM. After this, we focus on breaking more general TPM schemes.
The general strategy to recover the secret key of TPM/TTM systems is presented in 3. It requires finding a linear combination of public equations that depends only of a subspace of variables. This gives a simple linear algebra problem called MinRank: Let us consider some n × n matrices over GF(q): M 1 , . . . , M t . We need to find a linear combination M of the M i that has a small rank r < n. The name of MinRank has apparently been used first in the paper [19] that shows that MinRank is NP-complete. However the MinRank instances in TPM/TTM use very small r, e.g. the T.T. Moh's proposal from [16] gives r = 2. We note that the powerful idea of using a small rank goes back to the cryptanalysis of Shamir birational scheme [20] by Coppersmith, Stern and Vaudenay [6, 7] , and appears also in the Shamir-Kipnis attack on HFE [14] proposed by Patarin [17] .
In 2.2 we explain how to use the TPM schemes in encryption which is possible only if q r is small. However, in the section 5 we present an attack that works precisely when q r is small, based on the small co-dimension of the kernel of the unknown matrix M . This 'Kernel attack' breaks in approximately 2 52 a cryptosystem with 512 bit cleartexts.
Similarly in 2.2 we explain how to use the TPM schemes in signature; possible only with q u not too big. Then in section 6 we introduce the 'Degeneracy attack' on TPM based on iterative searching of degenerate polynomials. It works precisely when q u is small and the signature proposals of [15, 16] are insecure.
2 The TPM Family of Cryptosystems
General Description of TPM
In the present section, we describe the general family TPM(n, u, r, K), with:
-n, u, r integers such that r ≤ n. We also systematically put m = n + u − r.
-K = GF(q) a finite field.
We first consider a function Ψ : K n → K n+u−r such that (y 1 , . . . , y n+u−r ) = Ψ (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is defined by the following system of equations:
x n−r+1 , . . . , x n )
x n−r+1 , . . . , x n ) . . . y n−r = x n−r + g n−r (x 1 , . . . , x n−r−1 ; x n−r+1 , . . . , x n ) y n−r+1 = g n−r+1 (x 1 , . . . , x n ) . . .
with each g i (1 ≤ i ≤ n + u − r) being a randomly chosen quadratic polynomial.
The Public Key
The user selects a random invertible affine transformation s : K n → K n , and a random invertible affine transformation t :
By construction, if we denote (y 1 , . . . , y n+u−r ) = F (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we obtain an explicit set {P 1 , . . . , P n+u−r } of (n + u − r) quadratic polynomials in n variables, such that:
This set of (n + u − r) quadratic polynomials constitute the public key of this TPM(n, u, r, K) cryptosystem. Its size is 1 8 (n + u − r)(n + 1)( n 2 + 1) log 2 (q) bytes.
Encryption Protocol (when u ≥ r)

Encrypting a message
Given a plaintext (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ K n , the sender computes y i = P i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + u − r -thanks to the public key -and sends the ciphertext (y 1 , . . . , y n+u−r ) ∈ K n+u−r .
Decrypting a message
Given a ciphertext (y 1 , . . . , y n+u−r ) ∈ K n+u−r , the legitimate receiver recovers the plaintext by the following method.
-Compute (y 1 , . . . , y n+u−r ) = t −1 (y 1 , . . . , y n+u−r ) ; -Make an exhaustive search on the r-tuple (x n−r+1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ K r , until the n-tuple (x 1 , . . . , x n ) obtained by This decryption algorithm thus has a complexity essentially O(q r ). As a result, a TPM(n, u, r, K) cryptosystem can be practically used in encryption mode only under the assumption that q r is "small enough". The condition u ≥ r insures that the probability of obtaining a collision is negligible, and thus that the ciphering function F can be considered as an injection from K n into K n+u−r . When r = u = 0, this kind of scheme has been considered and attacked by Fell and Diffie in [11] (in an iterated form) and by Patarin and Goubin in [18] . All these attacks explore the fact that the inverse function if of low degree in some variables, whereas the present paper cryptanalyses much more general cases with r = 0 and u = 0.
Signature Protocol (when u ≤ r)
Signing a message Given a message M , we suppose that (y 1 , . . . , y n+u−r ) = h(M ) ∈ K n+u−r , with h being a (collision-free) hash function. To sign the message M , the legitimate user:
-computes (y 1 , . . . , y n+u−r ) = t −1 (y 1 , . . . , y n+u−r ) ; -chooses random r-tuples (x n−r+1 , . . . , x n ), until the n-tuple (x 1 , . . . , x n ) obtained by
This signature algorithm thus has a complexity essentially O(q u ). As a result, a TPM(n, u, r, K) cryptosystem can be practically used in signature mode only under the assumption that q u is "small enough".
The condition u ≤ r insures that the probability of finding no solution for (x 1 , . . . , x n ) for the equation Ψ (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = (y 1 , . . . , y n+u−r ) is negligible, and thus that the ciphering function F can be viewed as an surjection from K n onto K n+u−r .
We will describe in section 6 a general attack on this signature scheme, that is also applicable when u is non-zero, with q u not too large. Therefore the signature proposed by T.T. Moh in [15, 16] is insecure.
The TTM encryption system
In the present section, we recall the original description of the TTM cryptosystem, given by T.T. Moh in [15, 16] . This definition of TTM is based on the concept of tame automorphisms. As we will see, TTM is a particular case of our general family TPM: it belongs to the family TPM(64, 38, 2,GF(256)).
General Principle
Let K be a finite field (which will be supposed "small" in real applications). We first consider two bijections Φ 2 and Φ 3 from K n+v to K n+v , with (z 1 , . . . , z n+v ) = Φ 2 (x 1 , . . . , x n+v ) and (y 1 , . . . , y n+v ) = Φ 3 (z 1 , . . . , z n+v ) defined by the two following systems of equations :
. . .
with f 2 , . . . , f n+v quadratic forms over K, and P , Q two polynomials of degree eight over K. Φ 2 and Φ 3 are both "tame automorphisms" (see [15, 16] for a definition) and thus are one-to-one transformations. As a result, (x 1 , . . . , x n+v ) → (y 1 , . . . , y n+v ) = Φ 3 • Φ 2 (x 1 , . . . , x n+v ) is also one-to-one and can be described by the following system of equations :
T.T. Moh found a clever way of choosing P , Q and f i such that y 1 and y 2 both become quadratic functions of x 1 , . . . , x n when we set x n+1 = . . . = x n+v = 0.
Actual Parameters
This paragraph is given in the appendix. T.T. Moh chooses n = 64, v = 36 and K = GF(256). As a result, TTM belongs to TPM(64, 38, 2,GF (256)). Applying the formula of section 2.1, the size of the public keys is 214.5 Ko.
General strategy of TPM attacks
In the present section, we describe a general strategy to attack a cryptosystem of the TPM Family when r is "small". It will amount to solving the MinRank problem. As a result TTM, that is a TPM(64, 38, 2,GF(256)) will be broken.
The MinRank Problem
Let r be an integer and K a field. We denote by MinRank(r) the following problem: given a set {M 1 , . . . , M m } of n × n matrices whose coefficients lie in K,
The (even more) general MinRank problem has been first defined and studied by Shallit, Frandsen and Buss in [19] . It generalizes the "Rank Distance Coding" problem by Gabidulin [12] , studied also in [3, 22] ), which itself generalizes the "Minimal Weight" problem of error correcting codes (see [1, 21, 2, 13] ). In the Shamir-Kipnis attack on the Patarin's HFE cryptosystem [14, 17] , the authors used an instance of MinRank(r) with r = log q n + 1 and therefore their attack is not polynomial. In the present paper r is a small constant, e.g. 2. We note that the idea of finding small ranks has first been used by Coppersmith, Stern and Vaudenay in [6, 7] for breaking Shamir's birational scheme [20] .
Recently Courtois proposed a new zero-knowledge scheme based on MinRank [10, 9] . Though in the present paper only two algorithms for MinRank are introduced, another two can be found in [9] .
Complexity of MinRank
The general MinRank problem has been proven to be NP-complete by Shallit, Frandsen and Buss (see [19] ). More precisely, they prove that MinRank(r) NPcomplete when r = n − 1 (this corresponds to the problem of finding a linear combination of M 1 , . . . , M m that is singular). The principle of their proof consists in writing any set of multivariate equations as an instance of MinRank. It can be used in the same way to extend their result to the cases r = n − 2, r = n − 3, . . . and even r = n α (when α > 0 is fixed). However, MinRank is not hard when r gets smaller, indeed, in 5 we will introduce an expected polynomial time algorithm to solve the MinRank for any fixed r.
Strategy of attack
We recall that m = n+u−r. We suppose m ≤ 2n, as an encryption function with expansion rate > 2 is unacceptable. Moreover, if m > O(n), the cryptosystem is expected to be broken by Gröbner bases [8] .
In each equation
, the homogeneous part is given by t XA i X, with t X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), A i being a (secret) matrix. Similarly, in each public equation y i = P i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is given by t X M i X , with t X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), M i being a (public) matrix. The fact that (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = s(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and (y 1 , . . . , y m ) = t(y 1 , . . . , y m ) implies that there exist an invertible n × n matrix S and an invertible m × m matrix T such that:
Let T −1 = (t ij ) 1≤i,j≤m . We thus have, for any X :
From the construction of TPM(n, u, r, K), we have Rank(A 1 ) ≤ r. λ j M j ≤ r. With a good probability, we can suppose that:
Then we deduce the vector spaces V 0 = S −1 (K n−r × {0} r ) (corresponding to x n−r+1 = . . . = x n = 0) and W 0 = S −1 ({0} n−r × K r ) (corresponding to x 1 = . . . = x n−r = 0) by simply noticing that V 0 = Im
Once we have found V 0 and W 0 , we can easily deduce the vector space V 1 = S −1 ({0} × K n−r−1 × {0} r ) of dimension 1 (corresponding to x 1 = x n−r+1 = . . . = x n = 0) and W 1 = S −1 (K × {0} n−r−1 × K r ) (corresponding to x 2 = . . . = x n−r = 0): we just look for coefficients α 1 , . . . , α n , β 1 , . . . , β m such that the following equation:
holds for any element of V 0 . This can be obtained by simple Gaussian reduction. We also obtain the g 2 quadratic function by Gaussian reduction.
By repeating these steps, we obtain two sequences of vector spaces:
At the end, we have completely determined the secret transformations s and t, together with the secret functions g i . As a result, this algorithm completely breaks the TPM family of cryptosystems (we recovered the secret key).
Special case attacks on TPM
The 'Linearity Attack' on TTM
In this paragraph, we study the particular case of TTM, as described by T.T. Moh in [15, 16] . In this case, we show that the MinRank(r) problem is easily solved, because of the particular structure of the Q 8 function used in Φ 3 .
Description of the Attack
In section 3.3, we proved that an attack can be successfully performed on TTM this cryptosystem, as soon as we can find out the vector spaces V 0 = S −1 ({0} 2 × K 62 ) (corresponding to x 1 = x 2 = 0) and W 0 = S −1 (K 2 × {0} 62 ) (corresponding to x 3 = . . . = x 64 = 0). At first sight, the equations giving y 1 and y 2 seem to be quadratic in (x 1 , . . . , x 64 ). This leads a priori to an instance of MinRank(2).
However, note that the function x → x 2 is linear on K = GF(256), considered as a vector space of dimension 8 over F = GF(2). Therefore, considering the equations describing the (secret) Ψ function of TTM 1 , if we choose a basis (ω 1 , . . . , ω 8 ) of K over F and write x i = x i,1 ω 1 +. . .+x i,8 ω 8 (1 ≤ i ≤ 64), y 1 and y 2 become linear functions of x 1,1 , x 1,2 , . . . , x 1,8 , . . . , x 64,1 , . . . , x 64, 8 . In terms of MinRank, this means that TTM leads to an instance of MinRank(0) for 8n × 8n matrices (instead of an instance of MinRank(2) for n × n matrices). This leads to the following attack on TTM: (β 1 , . . . , β 100 , α 1,1 , . . . , α 64,8 ) ∈ K 612 satisfying:
This can be done by Gaussian reduction. We thus obtain the vector spaces V 0 and W 0 defined above. 3. The remaining part of the attack is exactly the same as in section 3.3.
Complexity of the Attack
The main part of the algorithm consists in solving a system of linear equations on 612 variables, by Gaussian reduction. We thus obtain a complexity of approximately 2 28 elementary operations to break TTM.
Solution to the TTM 2.1 Challenge of US Data Security
In 1997, US Data Security published on the internet 3 challenges about TTM (see Moreover it was broken in a simpler way that we described above. By iterative exploration of it's linearities, in 3 minutes on a PC we obtained the following plaintext which can be easily checked to be the exact solution to TTM 2.1. (note that the quotation marks are part of this plaintext):
"Tao TTP way BCKP of living hui mountain wen river moon love pt"
The 'Kernel Attack' on MinRank and TPM
In the present section we need the strategy of attack from 3.3 and use it with a new attack on MinRank(r), which works when q r is small enough.
Description of the Attack (notations are as in 3.3)
1. Choose k random vectors X [1] , . . . , X [k] (with k an integer depending on n and m, that we define below). Since dim Ker( t SA 1 S) = n− Rank( t SA 1 S) ≥ n − r, we have the simultaneous conditions X
[i] ∈ Ker( t SA i S) (1 ≤ i ≤ k) with a probability ≥ q −kr .
2. We suppose we have chosen a "good" set {X [1] , . . . , X
[k] } of k vectors (i.e. such that they all belong to Ker( t SA 1 S)). Then we can find an m-tuple
They are solution of a system of kn linear equations in m indeterminates. As a result, if we let k = m n , the solution is essentially unique and can be easily found by Gaussian reduction. We thus obtain the two vector spaces V 0 = S −1 (K n−r × {0} r ) (corresponding to x n−r+1 = . . . = x n = 0) and
The remaining part of the attack is exactly the same as in section 3.3.
Complexity of the Attack
The complexity of the attack is easily computed: O(q m n r · m 3 ).
Application to TTM
In the particular case of TTM, we have q = 256, n = 64, m = 100 and r = 2.
We thus obtain an attack on TTM with complexity O(2 52 ).
Note: Compared to the 2 28 of section 4.1, this attack is slower, but it does not make use of any linearity of y 1 and y 2 , so that it can also be used to break possible generalizations of TTM, with more general "Q 8 components" (see [4] for examples of Q 8 which provide non linear expressions for y 1 and y 2 over GF(2)).
6 The 'Degeneracy Attack' on TPM signature schemes
We describe here a general attack on TMP signature schemes (recall that such schemes are possible only for u ≤ r), when q u is not too large. From the description of the attack, its complexity is easily seen to be O(q u · n 6 ). We use the same notations as in section 3.3. In particular, m = n + u − r.
1. We choose a random m-tuple (β 1 , . . . , β m ) ∈ K m . With a probability q −u−1 , we can suppose that β i P i is a degenerate quadratic polynomial (i.e. a quadratic polynomial which can be rewritten with fewer variables after a linear change of variables). The fact that a quadratic polynomial is degenerate can easily be detected: for instance by using its canonical form (see [18] for some other methods). 2. Suppose we have found a "good" m-tuple (β 1 , . . . , β m ). Considering the new set of (< n) variables for the quadratic form m i=1 β i P i , we deduce easily the vector space W n−r = S −1 (K n−r−1 × {0} × K r ). 3. Then we look for a n-tuple (α 1 , . . . , α n ) ∈ K n and a quadratic function g n−r , such that:
is true for any (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ W n−r . This can be done by Gaussian reduction. We thus obtain the vector space V n−r = S −1 ({0} n−r−1 × K × {0} r ) and the quadratic polynomial g n−r . 4. The same principle can be repeated n−r times, so as to obtain two sequences of vector spaces:
At the end, as in the attack described in section 3.3, we have completely determined the secret transformations s and t, together with the secret functions g i . As a result, this algorithm completely breaks the TPM family in signature mode (we recovered the secret key).
Conclusion
We cryptanalysed a large class of cryptosystems TPM, that includes TTM as described by T.T. Moh [16] . They can be broken in polynomial time, as long as r is fixed. The proposed TTM cryptosystem [16] can be broken in 2 28 due to linearities. Thus we could easily break the "TTM 2.1" challenge proposed by US Data Security in October 1997. Even if Q 8 was nonlinear, and since r = 2, it is still broken in 2 52 elementary operations for a 512-bit cryptosystem. We also showed that signature schemes using TPM are insecure. There is very little hope that a secure triangular system will ever be proposed. We put n = 64, v = 36, and we consider the t i = t i (u 1 , . . . , u 19 ) (1 ≤ i ≤ 19) as randomly chosen linear forms (i.e. homogeneous polynomials of degree one in u 1 , . . . , u 19 ), satisfying the following conditions: The Public Key
The user selects a random invertible affine transformation Φ 1 : K 64 → K 64 , and a random invertible affine transformation This set of 100 polynomials constitutes the public key of the TTM cryptosystem.
Encrypting a message
Given a plaintext (x 1 , . . . , x 64 ) ∈ K 64 , the sender computes y i = P i (x 1 , . . . , x 64 ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 100 (thanks to the public key) and sends the ciphertext (y 1 , . . . , y 100 ).
